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Narrating Pain: C.S. Lewis and the Problem of Evil
Samuel Joeckel

Over 20 years separate the publication dates of
C.S. Lewis’s The Problem of Pain and A Grief
Observed. Written relatively early in both his career
and in his pilgrimage as a Christian, The Problem of
Pain takes its place in a genre that is at least as old as
the book of Job: the theodicy, the attempt to address the
question, ‘Why does God allow bad things to happen?’
Lewis’s return to this topic roughly 20 years after the
publication of The Problem of Pain—albeit in a
radically different discursive form—suggests that this
question never goes away, no matter how cogent the
argument or compelling the answer. Lewis returned to
the subject late in his Christian pilgrimage frankly
because he had to. The death of his wife, Joy Davidman
Gresham, hurled Lewis into a crisis of suffering that
caused him to doubt everything that he believed.
Writing what was later titled A Grief Observed was
therapeutic for Lewis, who called the book a “defense
against total collapse, a safety valve” (22).
When I teach a course on Lewis, I like to hold the
two books on pain and suffering, one in each hand,
raise them toward my students, and ask, ‘Which of
these two texts would give you more comfort in your
own crisis of suffering? Which of the two would you
recommend to the sufferer?’ Almost unanimously, my
students reply, ‘A Grief Observed’—this despite the
fact that A Grief Observed depicts a Lewis grappling
with God, angry with and frightened by God, a Lewis
who, in his darker moments, suggests that God had
successfully played a “vile practical joke” on His own
Son (34). Clearly something more than twenty years
separate the triumphant Problem of Pain and the tragic
A Grief Observed: Though written by the same author
on the same subject, the two texts diverge in discursive
methods, tone, and in attestations that are just plain
contradictory. In this essay, I will explore some of these
points of divergence, seeking to understand why my
students and other Lewis readers resonate more strongly
with the narrative account of suffering and loss

registered in A Grief Observed than with the rational
defense of God’s goodness in the face of suffering,
philosophized in The Problem of Pain.
One major theodicy presented in The Problem of
Pain originates—at least to my knowledge—in the
writings of the Apostle Paul. In 1 Corinthians 12, Paul
pleads with the Lord to remove his thorn in the flesh.
The Lord, however, flatly rejects Paul’s request,
responding, “‘My grace is sufficient for you, for my
power is made perfect in weakness’” (1 Corinthians
12:8). Paradoxically strengthened by his own
weaknesses, Paul begins to delight in hardships and in
difficulties. Similarly, in The Problem of Pain, Lewis
points to the paradox of suffering—how pain can
occasion human responses that allow God to transform
people. In one of the most famous sentences of the
book, Lewis writes, “God whispers to us in our
pleasures, speaks in our conscience, but shouts in our
pains; it is his megaphone to rouse a deaf world” (83).
“Pain,” Lewis continues, “shatters the creature’s false
self-sufficiency; the will must be surrendered to God”
(91).
The Lewis of A Grief Observed, on the other hand,
wrestles with a pain that shatters more than selfsufficiency; it seems to explode the entire foundation
upon which Lewis built his earlier theodicy. As Lewis
admits in A Grief Observed, “What grounds has [Joy’s
death] given me for doubting all that I believe? …We
were even promised sufferings. They were part of the
program. We were told, ‘Blessed are they that mourn,’
and I accepted it. I’ve got nothing that I hadn’t
bargained for. Of course it is different when the thing
happens to oneself, not to others, and in reality, not in
the imagination” (42). These sentences inscribe the
hard-earned truth that when theodicy meets reality,
reality generally wins. Later in A Grief Observed, in
fact, Lewis implies that philosophical, theodicybuilding approaches to suffering only compound the
problem of pain by proposing answers to ill-formed
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questions, false starting points of inquiry. He writes,
“Can a mortal ask questions which God finds
unanswerable? Quite easily, I should think. All
nonsense questions are unanswerable. How many hours
are there in a mile? Is yellow square or round? Probably
half the questions we ask—half our great theological
and metaphysical problems—are like that” (81). In
stark contrast to the self-assured Lewis of The Problem
of Pain, the doubting Lewis of A Grief Observed admits
that “there is nothing we can do with suffering except to
suffer it” (38).
Other disquieting contradictions augment the
conceptual and tonal distance separating the two texts.
In a chapter titled “Divine Goodness” in The Problem
of Pain, Lewis states that love may cause pain to its
object. As Lewis writes, “It is for people whom we care
nothing about that we demand happiness on any terms:
with our friends, lovers, and children, we are exacting
and would rather see them suffer much than be happy in
contemptible and estranging modes…If God is love, He
is something more than kindness.” Re-invoking what I
earlier called the paradox of suffering, Lewis argues
that this something-more-than-kindness—divine
goodness and love—“demands the perfecting of the
beloved,” paradoxically accomplished through the
refining fires of suffering. In A Grief Observed,
however, when Lewis seeks out that paradoxical
experience created by divine goodness and love, he
finds only divine rejection. He explains, “But go to
[God] when your need is desperate, when all other help
is vain, and what do you find? A door slammed in your
face, and a sound of bolting and double bolting on the
inside. After that, silence” (4).
The contradictions between the two books on
suffering and loss are thus inescapable. While the Lewis
of The Problem of Pain could expatiate in chapter’s
length on the non-contradiction between human
suffering and divine goodness, the Lewis of A Grief
Observed seems to undermine that notion of divine
goodness with one agonized sweep of the pen. “Sooner
or later,” this tortured Lewis admits, “I must face the
question in plain language. What reason have we,
except our own desperate wishes, to believe that God is,
by any standard we can conceive, ‘good’? Doesn’t all
the prima facie evidence suggest exactly the opposite?
What have we to set against it?” (33-34). The reconceptualization of divine goodness in The Problem of
Pain becomes re-re-conceptualized in A Grief
Observed—to the point that divine goodness falls
outside the pale of anything we can call good.
In addition to enduring the all-consuming pangs of
an encompassing suffering, the Lewis of A Grief
Observed also experiences more particularized throes
of despair for which I believe the Lewis of The Problem
of Pain never accounted. Once Joy died, Lewis began
to construct in his mind an imaginary Joy, what he in

his self-pity calls a “mere doll to be blubbered over.”
The reality of Joy—her physical presence—is no longer
there to check him, and he possessed no clear
photograph of her. To his horror, Lewis realizes that he
cannot remember her clearly. In his overpowering grief,
Lewis begins to commemorate a woman who exists
only as an imaginary construct.
Though the struggles like these recorded in A Grief
Observed make some of Lewis’s more conservative
Christian readers nervous and uncomfortable, it would
be misleading to overemphasize the hopelessness of the
text; it is not an account of Lewis’s apostasy. And my
students (at a conservative Christian university)
certainly would not give it the nod over The Problem of
Pain if it were. Though his life would never be the
same, Lewis works through his grief, gradually finding
some resolution.
Perhaps most significantly, Lewis realizes that the
unrestrained, plaintive cries of the sufferer can drown
out God’s voice even when that voice is projected
through the megaphone described in The Problem of
Pain. In a passage that marks an important shift in A
Grief Observed, Lewis achieves yet another hardearned insight, this time one that brings him comfort:
I have gradually been coming to feel that the
door is no longer shut and bolted. Was it my
own frantic need that slammed it in my face?
The time when there is nothing at all in your
soul except a cry for help may be just the time
when God can’t give it: you are like the
drowning man who can’t be helped because he
clutches and grabs. Perhaps your own
reiterated cries deafen you to the voice you
hoped to hear. (53-54)
In addition, when that “frantic need” and those
“reiterated cries” subside, Lewis can once again fix his
mind’s eye on the real Joy, not the one constructed by
self-pity and an imagination skewed by grief and
desperation. “Passionate grief,” writes Lewis, “does not
link us with the dead but cuts us off from them. This
becomes clearer and clearer. It is just at those moments
when I feel least sorrow—getting into my morning bath
is usually one of them—that [Joy] rushes upon my mind
in her full reality, her otherness” (64-65).
My sense is that the shockingly honest, emotionally
and spiritually charged narrative of suffering and loss in
A Grief Observed comes across as more real, more
authentic and genuine to my students than does the
theoretically oriented, painstakingly argued theodicy
offered in The Problem of Pain. Students seem more
compelled by the organically developed conclusion in A
Grief Observed that suffering, when it is
overwhelmingly great, can de-sensitize our receptivity
to God’s voice. Some students know this experientially;
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they read their own narrative in Lewis’s narrative and
perhaps find that Lewis gives voice to some of their
own moments of doubt and despair.
I am more interested, however, in the underlying
factors behind this preference, this partiality toward
narrative. By extrapolation, it would seem that the
evidential arguments that buttress the theodicies of such
popular Christian thinkers as Josh McDowell, Lee
Strobel, Ravi Zacharias, R.C. Sproul, and William Lane
Craig would be less convincing to my students than
narrative accounts of suffering and loss. These students
are not anomalous: Their sentiments echo a growing
consensus in the academic community—one that is
sympathetic to narrative approaches to the problem of
evil.
Before launching his own philosophical theodicy,
for example, Daniel Howard-Snyder makes a distinction
between the “practical problem of evil and the
theoretical problem of evil” (79). He then admits that
many of his readers will be disappointed by his
exclusive focus on the theoretical problem: “I am in
sympathy with them. After all, evil and suffering are too
real to be dealt with on a merely theoretical level….
The premise here is true: for many people, there are
times when ‘philosophical twaddle’ about God and evil
cannot meet their needs” (80). Philosopher Susan J.
Brison also notes how philosophical discourse often
empties suffering of its lived, individualized meanings.
A victim of sexual assault, Brison struggles to localize
terms that are easily dislodged from their particularized
context: “And I felt that I had very little control over the
meaning of the word ‘rape.’ Using the term denied the
particularity of what I had experienced and invoked in
other people whatever rape scenario they had already
constructed.”
Brison’s
language—“localized
terms,”
“particularized contexts”—suggests that the experience
of suffering and loss opens up a space that tends to
bifurcate discursive approaches to the problem of evil.
On the one hand, philosophical approaches, like those
found in Lewis’s The Problem of Pain, often operate
from outside the space of suffering, from a deindividualized vantage point that, if successful, will
render universally binding conclusions. Analyzing the
space of suffering from outside that very space, such
approaches necessarily maintain a phenomenological
distance from suffering, combating the problem of evil
from an abstract, de-particularized perspective;
concrete instances of evil are held at bay while the
theodicy-maker squares off against the universal
problem of evil. On the other hand, narrative
approaches—like that found in Lewis’s A Grief
Observed—operate from inside the space of suffering,
occupying the personalized space of individuals
grappling with evil. Such narratives eliminate that
phenomenological distance and give representation to

concrete, particularized experiences of suffering; evil
rushes in upon the reader as the narrative unfolds.
Lewis often favored the philosophical, departicularized perspective, for in many ways, Lewis was
a product of his age. He gave reasons for the hope that
lay within him using Enlightenment standards of
rationality. The philosophical framework of The
Problem of Pain—its clear stance of analyzing
suffering from outside the space of suffering—is a
testament to that fact. However, when Joy died in 1960,
he was forced to return to the problem of pain in a way
that made him so uncomfortable that, when A Grief
Observed was published, he resorted to the use of a
pseudonym (N.W. Clerk). Namely, Lewis was forced to
enter the space of suffering where the particularities of
his own experience became evident. Lewis thus
necessarily shed his typical discursive identity as a
dispassionate inquirer whose reasonable conclusions
were irrefutable to anyone exercising good common
sense and impartiality. The Lewis of A Grief Observed
is convincing to my students precisely because he is
partial. By necessity, he abandons the decontextualized, neutral posture adopted in The Problem
of Pain and begins a narrative of suffering and loss that
is already embedded in a context: that of a middle-aged
academic who recently lost his wife, who wants to turn
to his Christian faith but finds God’s presence to be
overshadowed by the tyrannizing presence of grief.
Once Lewis steps inside the space of suffering, he
necessarily perspectivizes his narrative and sheds the
de-localized voice that predominates in many of his
other books on faith. Unlike The Problem of Pain, A
Grief Observed draws readers into a deeply
contextualized scenario, and it is within this context that
the truth claims and conclusions that Lewis narratively
works out achieve a richer and more convincing
coherence and meaning.
What Lewis shows my students not only in A Grief
Observed but also in his fantasy and science fiction
literature is that Christians are in an advantageous
position to flesh out truth claims that proceed from
contextualized narratives. Lewis, after all, identified
Christianity as a myth—the archetypal narrative—that
became fact. Lewis’s myths project worlds, open up
spaces that beckon the reader to enter. Once inside this
space, Christian truth claims achieve a fuller resonance
because they are placed within a specific context.
What is true for Christian truth claims is true for
Christian suffering. In Book 1 of The Chronicles of
Narnia, The Magician’s Nephew, for example, young
Digory Kirke pleads with Aslan to give him something
that will cure his dying mother. As Lewis narrates,
‘But please, please—won’t you—can’t you
give me something that will cure Mother?’ Up
till then he had been looking at the Lion’s
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great feet and the huge claws on them; now, in
his despair, he looked up at its face. What he
saw surprised him as much as anything in his
whole life. For the tawny face was bent down
near his own and (wonder of wonders) great
shining tears stood in the Lion’s eyes. They
were such big, bright tears compared with
Digory’s own that for a moment he felt as if
the Lion must really be sorrier about his
Mother than he was himself.
‘My son, my son,’ said Aslan. ‘I know. Grief
is great. Only you and I in this land know that
yet. Let us be good to one another.’ (168)
This passage shows that Christians are in that
advantageous position mentioned earlier not only
because they have a narrative that contextualizes truth
claims. Perhaps more importantly, this passage reveals
that the One who permits suffering suffers Himself. He
involves Himself, as Aslan does with Digory, in the
personal narratives of grief and despair lived out by his
own children. To use my previous metaphor, like
narrative approaches to the problem of evil, God enters
the space of human suffering. Once inside, He
participates in the unbearable grief that is observed
there. The Magician’s Nephew at this particular point
brings readers inside the space of suffering, where
Aslan not only meets Digory, but, for the engaged
reader, where God can also meet us as we endure pain
and despair. Narrative accounts of suffering and loss
like A Grief Observed encourage my students that God
can likewise meet them there in their own respective
contexts—their own particularized spaces of suffering.
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